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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
FAYE 'V ALKER OS~fUS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VB. 
HARHY OS~IUS, 
Defendant and .Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
Statement of the Case 
Case No. 
7152 
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable 
J. Allan Crockett, one of the judges of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, holding the defendant in contempt 
for failure to abide by a decree of this court for payment 
of alimony and support money as provided in a decree 
of divorce heretofore entered in the above entitled cause, 
and also an• appeal from the order of th~ same judge 
in the same cause refusing to grant defendant's petition 
for modification of said decree. 
On March 14, 194 7, the plaintiff filed her complaint 
asking for a decree of separate maintenance from the 
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defendant, and asking for the custody of Colleen Osmus, 
born December 22, 1940; Diane Osmus, born. July 24, 
1942; and Darryl Osmus, born April 3, 1946; and praying. 
for $350.00 per month alimony and maintenance money 
for the children; and that summons thereupon issued. 
(R. 1-4) 
That on July 15, 1947, counsel for plaintiff and 
counsel for defendant entered into a written stipulation 
stipulating that the court make a temporary order grant-
ing to plaintiff· the sum of $100.00 per month as tempor-
ary support money for herself and children, to be paid 
at the rate of $25.00 per week beginning on the date of 
the order, and further ordering the defendant to pay to 
plaintiff's attorney $50.00 on or before August 1, 1947. 
(R. 7) That on July 15, 1947, the Honorable Roald A. 
Hogenson signed an order pursuant to the above stipula-
tion. (R. 6) 
That on July 21, 1947, the defendant herein filed his 
answer to plaintiff's complaint and a counterclaim 
(termed "cross-complaint") wherein he asked for a 
decree of divorce against the plaintiff. (R. 9-13) That 
thereafter, to-wit, on the 29th day of August, 1947, the 
plaintiff herein filed her reply to defendant's answer 
and her answer to defendant's counterclaim. (R. 14-15) 
That later, to-wit, on the 29th day of August, 1947, the 
plaintiff herein filed an amended complaint asking for 
a decree of separate maintenance and for the sum of 
$350.00 as alimony and support money, together with at-
torney's fees. (R. 16-20) That thereafter, to-wit, on the 
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7th day of October, 1947, the plaintiff herein filed her 
second amended complaint in the above action, wherein 
she asked for a decree of divorce from the defendant, and 
that she be awarded custody of the three minor children, 
and the defendant to pay her $250.00 per month. ( R. 
22-26) That on October 7, 1947, the entry of appearance 
and waiver of the defendant was filed, which provide<l 
that he entered his appearance in the case and consented 
that his default be entered forthwith upon the condition 
that the alimony and support money awarded should not 
be more than the total amount of $250.00 per month. 
That on the 7th day of October, 1947, the plaintiff 
herein appeared before the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, 
and the default of the defendant being entered by reason 
of his appearance and waiver, the court heard the evi-
dence and made its Findings of Fact, and among other 
. things found as follows : 
'' 4. The plaintiff and defendant formerly 
resided at 1631 Kensington Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, at which address a home was being 
purchased on contract by and on behalf of this 
plaintiff for the sum of $10,750.00. That approxi-
mately $1,200.00 had prior to February, 1947 been 
paid upon said contract, but that since that date 
the defendant failed to make the contract pay-
ments, that the contract became in arrears, that 
plaintiff had no income from which to make the 
payments on said contract, was threatened with 
cancellation of said contract, and sold said home 
and said contract and received for her equity' the 
sum of approximately $5,000.00." (R. 29) 
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"5. That the defendant is an able bodied 
man of 39 years of age, is a capable manager of 
eating establishments and has been over a long 
period of time, through sharing profits in the 
business, ·earning an average of at least $850.00 
per month and is now capable of earning $500.00 
per month.'' (R. 30) 
' '7. That dfuring/ all iof the times ·herein 
stated, this plaintiff has been a devoted wife and 
1nother, and has spent her time exclusively in the 
care of her family. That she has no other or in-
dependent income, but is entirely dependent upon 
the defendant for the maintenance of herself and 
children. That Colleen, the eldest child of plain-
tiff and defendant, is now and has been for some 
time suffering from a rheumatic heart condition 
requiring a great deal of care by this plaintiff. 
'' 8. That this plaintiff has carefully cal-
culated the necessary expenses for the o·peration 
of the household of plaintiff and defendant, for 
the care, feeding and clothing of herself and the 
childre"u of phtintiff and defendant, and has de-
termined that with strict economy $250.00 is the 
least possible amount from which she could pay 
said expenses. That this amount does not include 
drugs, medicines, and medical care for the child, 
Colleen, afflicted with rheumatic heart condition.'' 
(R. 31) 
Thereupon, based upon the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the court entered its Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce on the 7th day of October, 1947. That 
in addition to providing for an interlocutory decree of 
divorce for plaintiff, the decree provided: 
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'' 2. That plaintiff have custody of the three 
1ninor children of plaintiff and defendant, Colleen 
Osn1us, Diane Osnn1~ and Darryl Osmus, with 
right of defendant to visit said children at reason-
able times. 
"3. That plaintiff have and is h~reby 
a warded the sum of $250.00 per month to be paid 
to the plaintiff by the defendant as alimony and 
support money for plaintiff and the children of 
plaintiff and defendant, $100.00 as alimony to 
plaintiff and $50.00 each to the children as sup-
port money, the first payment in said amount of 
$250.00 to be made by defendant to plaintiff within 
ten days from the entry of this decree. 
"5. That this court retain jurisdiction of 
this cause for all purposes which may to the court 
seem proper in the interests of the children of the 
plaintiff and defendant.'' (R. 33) · 
That on the 19th day of December, 1947, the plain-
tiff herein filed an affidavit setting out that on July 15, 
1947, the above court had entered its order ordering de-
fendant to pay plaintiff as temporary support money the 
sum of $25.00 per week until further order of the court, 
and to pay her attorney the sum of $50.00 as attorney's 
fees, and further, on the 7th day of October, 1947, the 
court entered its decree granting the plaintiff a divorce, 
custody of the three minor children, and ordering de-
fendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $250.00 per month as 
support money and alimony for plaintiff, and alleging 
that defendant had paid nothing except $50.00, leaving a 
balance due and owing of $723.26. That said affidavit 
alleged that defendant is an able-bodied man, steadily 
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employed, and capable of complying with the order of 
the court, and praying for an order directing defendant 
to appear and show cause why he should not be punished 
for contempt of court, and why he should not pay the 
plaintiff what was due her, and for additional attorney's 
f·ees. (R. 39) That pursuant to said affidavit, the Hon-
orable J. Allan Crockett, one of the judges of the above 
entitl~d court, entered an order ordering defendant to 
appear on Monday, the 22nd day of December, 1947, to 
show cause why the court should not make its order here-
in punishing the defendant for contempt of court, and 
why the defendant should not be compelled to pay plain-
tiff what was owing her, together with an attorney's 
fee. (R. 37) That said order was duly served on the 
defendant herein by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County. 
(R. 41) 
That on December 22, 1947, the defendant filed his 
petition for modification of decree, wherein, he set forth 
that he is now, and ever sin~e the decree was entered was, 
actually earning less than $100.00 per month, and is in-
capable of earning in excess of $40.00 per week, and 
was at the time the decree was entered earning less than 
$100.00 per month, and has been earning less than $100.00 
per month ~ince the 15th day of February, 1947. Defend-
ant denied that he was in contempt of court, and affirma-
tively alleged that he had paid $50.00 to. the plaintiff since 
the decree was entered, which was a sum far in excess of 
his ability to pay from his earnings, but that said sum 
was borrowed. Defendant also alleged that if he were 
given four or five months respite from any payments, he 
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would be able to make pay1nents to plaintiff of approxi-
mately $25.00 per week, but that it was impossible for 
hiin at that tiine to make any payments whatsoever. (R. 
42-43) 
That on December 22, 1947, the parties hereto ap-
peared before the Honorable J. Allan Crockett. Where-
upon, plaintiff and defendant were sworn and examined, 
and Theo Carlson was sworn and examined, and docu-
mentary proof was received in ·evi~ence, and the court 
thereupon made his Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
'' 1. That on the 7th day of October 1947 
the court made and entered its decree in the fore-
going action, granting to the plaintiff a divo-rce 
from the defendant; granting to the plaintiff the 
care, custody and control of three minor child-
ren, issue of said marriage, and ordering the de-
fendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $250.00 
per month as permanent alimony and as support 
money for said children. 
'' 2. That prior to the entry of said decree 
and on or about the 15th day of July 1947, while 
said action was pending, the court made and en-
tered its order in said action requiring the de-
fendant to pay to the plaintiff the· sum of $25.00 
per week, from said date, as temporary support 
money pending said action and the sum of $50.00 
attorney's fees for the use and benefit of her at-
torney therein. 
'' 3. That the defendant has paid nothing 
to the plaintiff under the terms of said decree or 
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otherwise, or under the terms of the order of the 
court for temporary support money and attorneys 
fees, except the sum of $50.00, and that there is 
due and owing to the plaintiff from the defendant 
under the terms of said order and decree of the 
court the su~ of $723.26, no part of which has 
been paid. 
"4. That the award of $250.00 per month 
payable to the plaintiff by the defendant by said 
decree of divorce, was entered by the court pur-
suant to stipulation of the defendant, through his 
attorneys, which stipulation is on file and of rec-
ord herein. 
'' 5. The court further finds frmn the evi-
dence introduced that the defendant is and was 
able-bodied, since the entry of the said order of 
the court and the decree of the court herein re-
ferred to and has been and now is capable of 
earning a sufficient amount to provide a sub-
stantial sum for the support of his former wife 
and his children, and that his earnings in the 
past has been as high as $800.00 per month as 
a cook, and that he is still able, with a reasonable 
effort to earn sufficient to comply with the terms 
of said decree, but disregarding the order of the 
court and decree herein, has wilfully failed to 
do so, but instead thereof has wilfully failed and 
neglected to find employment or seek ewploy-
ment or earn money with which to meet his ob-
ligations under said decree; that said defendant 
has attempted to justify his failure to comply with 
the order and decree of the court, . by testifying 
that he is working for his board and room for a 
1\f rs. Carlson, who has promised him an interest 
in her business of operating a lunch stand which 
the court finds is not a reasonable explanation 
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evasion of his obligations. 
"6. That the plaintiff and her children are 
dependent and have no income, except that sup-
plied to them by the Salt Lake County Public 
Welfare Department. 
"7. That $25.00 is a reasonable attorney's 
fee to allow plaintiff for the use and benefit of 
her attorney herein. 
'' 8. That the. defendant, by his evidence and 
by his petition for modification of said decree has 
shown no justifiable change of circumstances, 
since the entry of said decree herein to justify 
the court granting him any relief thereby. 
''From the foregoing findings of fact the 
court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
"That the defendant by his wilful failure to 
comply with the order and decree of the court is 
guilty of contempt of court and should be punished 
therefor. 
''That the defendant is not entitled to any 
relief by modification of the decree of the court 
and the same should be denied." (R. 46-48) 
and the court thereupon made its order as follows: 
''IT FS THEREFORE 0 R DE RED 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defend-
ant be and he is hereby adjudged in contempt of 
court for his wilful failure to comply with the 
order and decree of the court heretofore entered 
in said action and is hereby sentenced to be con-
fined in the County Jail of :Salt Lake County for 
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a period of twenty-five days commencing with the 
26th day of December 1947. 
''IT IS FURTHER 0 R D E R E D, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defend-
ant pay to the plaintiff, until the furth~r order 
of the court, one-half of his earnings, less proper 
deductions, to apply on current and past obliga-
tions to the plaintiff under the order and decree 
of the court, and that she have judgment for the 
sum ·of $25.00 for the use and benefit of her at-
torney herein in these proceedings. 
''IT IS FURTHER 0 R D E R E D, 
·ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the petition 
of defendant to modify the decree of divorce here-
in be and the same is hereby denied." (R. 49) 
That thereafter, within the time required by law, 
the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah from the order finding the defendant in 
contempt and sentencing him to serve twenty-five days 
in the county jail, and the order denying defendant's 
petition for modification of decree. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Kingman, 
Arizona, on :March 20, 1940, and from that union three 
children were born ; Colleen Osmus, born December 22, 
1940; Diane Osmus, born July 24, 1942; Darryl Osmus, 
born April3, 1946. (R. 1) 
This marriage was not destined to last, and the 
plaintiff on March 14, 1947, commenced the first of her 
actions against the defendant-a suit for separate main-
tenance, set forth in the Statement of the Case, supra. 
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On July 15, 1947, the parties entered into a stipulation 
whereby the defendant agreed to pay to plaintiff $100.00 
per n1onth as alimony and support money, payable 
$25.00 per week, and the further sum of $50.00 for at-
torney's fees. J~dge Hogenson signed and filed such an 
order on the 15th day of July, 1947. (R. 6) 
The defendant did not comply with this order, and 
only paUl $50.00 to the plaintiff some time in October, 
1947. On August 29, 1947, plaintiff filed her amended 
complaint, still praying for separate maintenance, where-
in she prayed for $350.00 alimony and support money. 
(R. 16-20) On October 7, 1947, plaintiff filed her second 
amended complaint, wherein she prayed for'a divorce and 
the sum of $250.00 per month, (R. 22-26) and on the 
same day the appearance and waiver of the defendant 
was filed (which was signed September 13, 1947), which 
contained the provision "that the alimony and support 
money to be awarded shall not be more than the total 
amount of $250.00 per month." (R. 27) On October 7, 
1947, the plaintiff was awarded a decree of divorce grant-
ing plaintiff $100.00 per month and $50.00 per month sup-
port money for each of the children, or a total of $250.00 
per month. The decree made no provision for costs or 
attorney's fees. (R. 33) 
At the hearing before the Honorable J. Allan Crock-
ett on December 22, ~ 1947, on plaintiff's order to show 
cause and defendant's petition for modification, evidence 
was adduced as follows: · 
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The defendant, Harry Osmus, was and always had 
been a fry cook, and that since the latter part of May, 
1947, he has been· rooming with and working for Mrs. 
Theo Carlson, who operates a restaurant at 6373 South 
State Street, 'Salt Lake City, Utah, and that he was work-
ing for board and room, and that he had no interest in 
the cafe whatsoever, and that he went to work for her 
about May 16, 1947. (R. 55-57) That prior to that time, 
that is, up, until February 15, 1947, he had worked for 
a Mr. D. F. Anderson, who operated Dee's Hamburger 
Stand in Salt Lake City, and that he earned around 
$800.00 per month while working for Mr. Anderson, but 
that his employment ceased with Mr. Anderson ·on Feb-
ruary 15, 1947. (R. 57) That between February 15th 
and May 16, 1947, the defendant had not worked at all. 
That he went to Vernal, Utah, and stayed with his 
brother for about five or six weeks, and he could not 
find a job there. That he did not make an effort to get 
a job as a fry cook in Salt Lake City because, if he started 
working for wages, people that had .bills and judgments 
·against him would garnishee his pay. (R. 58) That 
d~fendant went to work for ~Irs. Carlson, and he was 
eventually to get an interest in her business-in fact, a 
one-half interest- when she got the place paid for, and 
it was on a paying basis. That at that time she still owed 
approximately $125.00 on the inventory. The defendant 
was fry cook and did the cleaning up for Mrs. Carlson, 
and in addition to board and room he got a few dollars 
spending money, a total of less than $1.00 per day. That 
Mrs. Carlson had bought him one suit since the divorce. 
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The defendant testified that his attorney in the 
original divorce (a different attorney than the writer) 
adYised the defendant to sign a waiver and consent to the 
$250.00 alimony, and that later they could go back into 
court and cut the payments down to what he could pay. 
That he was not in court at the time of the divorce. (R. 
62) 
Upon cross-examination Mr. Osmus testified that 
~Irs. Carlson had put up all of the money for the pur-
chase of her cafe. That she had not been able to get her 
investment out of it. (R. 62) That the defendant had 
worked from 9:00 a.m. until 1.00 a.m. with the hope and 
expectation of getting an interest in the business, and 
hoped to build the business up so it would be more 
profitable than working for wages. That at his job as 
fry cook he could only earn $8.00 per day, and if he 
joined the union, he would only work five days a week 
and make a total of $40.00 per week, and he felt he could 
do better by staying with Mrs. Carlson. and getting a 
half interest in her business. (R. 64) Defendant was 
also fearful that if he took a job he would be garnisheed 
on account of the bills that were outstanding against 
him, a,nd that all of these bills were contracted by the 
plaintiff since her separation from him. (R. 63-64) 
The defendant also injured his shoulder about the 
7th of December and has been going to the doctor for 
treatments and on account of his inj·ury is unable to help 
Mrs. Carlson, and in fact, has spent most of the time in 
bed. Defendant testified that he was further afraid that 
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if he took a job his wages, would be garnisheed. The 
judge at that time made some remarks that judgments 
had been entered, and he wanted to know what the judg-
ments were. Defendant asked the court if bills turn·ed 
over to attorneys for collection were judgm·ents; where-
upon, the court stated: 
THE COURT: Let's not bother about giving 
you a legal education. If you know what they are 
tell us ; if you don't-
Defendant then stated he owed the power company· 
$19.00, the telephone company $30.00, Red Feather Oil 
Company $80.00, a milk bill of $40.00, a. furniture bill of 
$77.00, two doctor bills of $60.00 each, or a total of 
$120.00, and a number of the bills had been placed with 
the credit bureau for collection. 
At the time th~ divorce decree was entered for $250.00 
a month alimony, defendant was working at the same job 
he was at the time of the hearing. (R. 66-67) At the 
time of making $800.00 a month from Dee's Hamburger, 
h~ was managing the place on a percentage basis, and 
Mr. Anderson terminated that employment on the 15th 
of FebruarJ_T, 1947, twenty-seven days prior to the com-
mencement of the original action for separate mainten-
ance. 
In July, defendant offered to pay his wife $100.00 
permo~tP. if she wo11ld consent to a divorce on that basis, 
\>ut she said she would get $200.00 or know the reason 
why, and .she would get ·every dime defendant ever made; 
however, the stipulation and order of July 15, 1947, pro-
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vided for $100.00 per month temporary alimony and sup-
pOrt money. 
The defendant knew that Mrs. Osmus sold the ·home 
for $13,750.00 and there was around $8)400.00 due on it; 
that she realized approximately $5,000.00. 
Mrs. Osmus testified that she now lives at 2589 Elm 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, with her three· children, 
·and that she is now living on the help of the Welfare. 
That the three children were too young to be left alone, 
and she was not able to leave them or to work, and she 
had to stay with them. She testified that in November 
the County Welfare Department gave her $80.00, and 
in December $129.00, and that that covered her living 
expenses, rent, and bills. (R. 75) That at the time of 
the divorce she and her husband owned a very substantial 
home, and that she sold the equity for $5,000.00, and that 
she purchased a home in September aild paid $2,000.00 
on it, and that the payments on the home are $55.43 a 
month. That prior to the time she bought the home she 
lived at the New Ute Hotel. That with· the aid of the Wel-
fare she is able to make the payments on the home. (R. 
76-78) Mrs. Osmus spent the $3,000.00 over and above 
the down payment of the house during the four-month 
period she lived in the New Ute Hotel, prior to moving 
in her new home. She said she paid $5.00 per day for the 
hotel room and $25.00 a week for someone to take care 
of one of the small children. Part of the time she paid 
her sister and part of the time to her sister-in-law, Mrs. 
Reid Walker, for this work. The court thereupon ob-
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s·e~ved that the divorce was 'granted on the 7th day of 
October, 1947, mid that the house was bought and all 
the inone~; ·was spent by about the lst of September, 1947. 
The court made the following observation : 
THE COURT·: I have been talking all morn-
-ing about the fact that thl.s ·divorce was granted 
on the 7th of October. From anything I now see, 
the house was bought, all. the money was spent 
by about the first of September, but if you can 
show me some reason why this is material, I will 
listen to it because we have ·had a good deal of 
t~is back of the divorce. I thought we would try 
to confine ourselves to the . matters that trans-
pired since the ~ivorce happened. (R. 83-84) 
Then again: 
THE COURT: Fact - let's assume, even 
from the tenor of your cross examination, she 
was unwise and improvident about spending it, 
which it would be my. judgment that spending 
$3,000 in .four months' time would be lacking in 
proper management, that wouldn't do you much 
good if merely dissipated foolishly .. 
MR. LANGLOIS: Unless show some hidden 
some place. 
A. There is no money hid any P'lace. 
The Court: 'Vell, of course you are en-
titled to investigate that, if you wantto show that 
she· has, or ought to have, some available to cover 
this p·eriod since October 7 when Mr. Spence is 
wanting the defendant held in contempt for not 
paying. (R. 84) 
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The plaintiff then testified she bought the child-
ren·~ clothes, paid s01ne money to moving companies and 
l'or ~torage. On questioning by the court, :Mrs. Osn1us 
testified that she nwved in her new hon1e on the 15th of 
September, and that she had sufficient n1oney after buy-
ing the h01ne to liYe on until she asked for welfare aid irt 
November. ( R. 85) By "enough, she testified she meant 
that she had about $200.00 left and she paid rent and bills 
and the Family Service gave her $10.00 in October. That 
she had a little girl that developed Perthes' diseas·e, and 
that she had to wear a brace on her leg. ~Irs. Osmus testi-
fied she got $50.00 fron1 1\fr. Osnms in October. (R. 87) 
~irs. Theo Carlson testified she operated a drive-in 
cafe at 6373 South State Street, and that ever since the 
defendant parted fron1 his wife he had worked for her. 
She had not paid him any wages, but would give him a 
half interest if and when the place operated profitably 
and she recovered her original investment. She stated 
that for the past few months she had not made any 
profit at all, that she had paid him spending money, 
not exceeding $1.00 a day, and that she had given 
him board and room. (R. 87-91) That there were profits 
from the month of October of $149.50, and for November 
$106.55, and that her food and the food for defendant 
were taken frmn the business and treated as part of the 
business operation. (R. 91) That the business was good 
in June and July, 1947, and that the profits had run 
$400.00 per month, but that the profits had been put back 
in the business. That she expected the summer business 
of 1948 to be very good. (R. 92-94) 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The defendant makes the following assignments of 
error: 
I. 
The court's Finding of Fact No. 5 was contrary to 
and unsupported by the evidence, which finding reads 
as follows: 
'' The court further finds from the evidence 
introduced ·that the def~ndant, is and was able-
bodied, since the entry of the said order of· the 
court and the decree of the court herein referred 
to and. has been and now is~ capable of earning 
a sufficient amount to provide a substantial sum 
for the support of his former wife and his child-
ren, and that his earnings in the past has been as 
high as $800~00 per month as a cook, and that he 
is still able, with a reasonable effort to earn suf-
ficient to comply with the terms of said decree, 
but disregarding the order of the court and decree 
herein, has wilfully failed to do so, but instead 
thereof has wilfully failed and neglected to find 
employment or seek employment or earn money 
with which to meet his obligations under said de-
cree; that said defendant has attempted to justify 
his failure to comply with the order and decree of 
the court, by testifying that he is working for his 
board and room for a Mrs. Carlson, who has 
promised him an interest in her business of op.:. 
erating a lunch stand which the court finds is 
_ not a reasonable explanation of his failure to 
support his family and is a wilful evasion of his 
obligations.'' 
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II. 
The court erred in its failure to make a finding that 
defendant under the evidence was entitled to a Inodifica-
tion of said decree in respect to the lowering of said 
alimony and support nwney. 
III. 
The court erred in adjudging defendant in contempt 
of c.ourt for defendant's failure to comply with the order 
and decree of said court. 
That the court erred in denying defendant's petition 
for modification of the decree of divorc·e. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant relies upon each of the assignments · 
of error above set forth, and will consider the assi~-. 
Inents in the following arguments consisting of two dif-
ferent points : 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT'~ FINDING NO. 5 WAS CON-
TRARY TO AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE, AND THE COURT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED 
IN ADJUDGING THE DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT 
OF COURT FOR HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
THE ORDER AND DECREE OF COURT. (Assign-
ments Nos. 1 and 3.) 
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The defendant was found in contempt for failure to 
comply with Paragraph 3 of the decree of divorce en-
tered on October 7, 1947, by the Honorable J. Allan 
Crockett, which paragraph reads as follows: 
"3. That plaintiff have and is hereby 
awarded the sum of $250.00 per month to be paid 
to the plaintiff by the defendant as alimony and 
support money for plaintiff and the children of 
plaintiff and defendant, $100.00 as alimony to 
plaintiff and $50.00 each to the children as sup-
port money, the first payment in said amount of 
$250.00 to be made by defendant to plaintiff within 
ten days from the entry of this decree.'' (R. 33) 
At the time of the hearing on December 22, 1947, the 
defendant was in arrears the $250.00 paym·ents for Oc-
. tober, November and December, a total of $750.00. There 
is absolutely no evidence in the record that during the 
months of October, November and December he was able 
or capable of paying any amount whatsoever on the 
judgment. 
The rule has been laid down in practically all juris-
dictions that the inability of an alleged contemner, with-
out fault on his part, to render obedience to an order or 
decree of court is a good defense for disobedience of the 
order or decre·e. 
Note, 22 A.L.R. 1256 
Note, 31 A.L.R. 649 
Note, 40 A.L.R. 546 
Note, 76 A.L.R. 390 
Note, 120 A.L.R. '703 
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In the case of Hillyard l'. District Oourt (1926), 68 
Utah 220. 2-U) P. 806, Judge Gideon ~mid: 
• ·Under the authorities cited and the unifonn 
holdings of the courb. it is prerequisite in eon-
tempt proceedings of the nature here under revi~w 
to an order conunitting to jail that the one charged 
should be found able to comply with the court's 
order, or that he had intentionally deprived hiln-
~elf of the ability to comply with such order." 
Of course, the above authorities hold that an in-
ability to pay alnnony brought about by the defendant's 
o\vn acts for the purpose of avoiding it~ payment may be 
punished for contempt, or, stating it in the way of Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, Vol. 17, page 510, section 671: 
''In practically all jurisdictions it is held that 
a husband who is unable to obey a decree for the 
payment of alimony will not be adjudged in con-
tempt for not obeying such decree unless he has 
voluntarily created the disability for the purpose 
of avoiding such payments.'' 
In the case of Watson v. JV;a.tson, 72 U. 218, 269 P. 
( 2) 775, the lower court found: 
"Defendant has earned sufficient wages to 
pay said alimony but defendant has wilfully re-
fused to pay said alimony and this court finds 
that said defendant is in contempt of court for 
wilfully refusing to pay said alimony.'' 
The finding was sustained by the evidence; however, the 
court sentenced him to jail until he paid $600.00 de-
linquent alimony. The court did not find he had the 
abilit~· to pay $600.00. This court said: 
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''To support such a judgment in contempt it 
is clear that it should first appear that the act 
sought to be coerced was yet within the power of 
the person proceeded against to perform. It would 
be repugnant to reason and futile to order a per-
son imprisoned until he did some particular thing 
unless he had the present ability to do it.'' 
In this case ·the defendant was a fry cook. The un-
disputed evidence shows that when working for wages 
he would ·earn less than $200.00 per month. Like many 
men, he was evidently dissatisfied with working for 
wages, and some time during the married life of plain-
tiff and defe11dant he went to work on a commission basis 
for Dee's Hamburgers, and there he made $800.00 per 
month. How long he worked the record is silent, but he 
evidently earned enough to obtain more than a $5,000.00 
equity in a home. For some reason, on F·ebruary 15, 1947, 
some twenty-seven days prior to the plaintiff commenc-
ing her original action of separate maintenance, he lost 
his job. There is no evidence in the record that he left 
Dee's Hamburgers in order to deprive his family of 
support. He went to Vernal, looked for work and could 
not find it. He came back to Salt Lake and associated 
himself with Mrs. Theo Carlson's business. His wife had 
the accumulation of their married life in her name-the 
home. In April, 1947, she sold this and realized $5,000.00 
for it, and he knew it. The defendant was not faced with 
· a proposition of· accepting any low-paying job in order 
to keep and feed his wife and children. He had reason to 
believe and did believe that this $5,000.00 could keep them 
until he got on his feet financially. When parties are 
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111arried and living together, should the husband suffer 
financial reverses, should he los.e a high-paying position 
and be obliged to accept a lower one, then, of course, the 
entire fmnily must rec.oncile then1selves to a lower stand-
ard of living and readjust their econ01uic. situation ac-
cordingly. Should the rule be different just because the~r 
are separated'! It is a fact well known that once a man 
has tasted the high wages and high living standards that 
come with successful commission work or work for him-
self, he is loath indeed to go to work for wages. Many of 
our fortunes in this city were based upon the fact that 
son1e 1niner refused to work for wages, but starved 
through an unproductive lease until he struck it rich. 
The plaintiff in this case had $5,000, enough 1noney 
to keep herself and children in decent living conditions 
for over a year and until the def(mdant could rehabilitate 
himself. On July 15, 1947, the plaintiff and defendant en-
tered into their stipulation whereby he agreed to pay 
$100.00 per 1nonth for the support and maintenance of 
the minor children at the rate of $25.00 per week. At 
that time the p-laintiff did ~ot seem to feel that she re-
quired $250.00 per n1onth. On October 7th the decree was 
entered allowing $250.00 per month. The defendant stipu7 
lated to this. Why~ you may ask. Every practicing at-
torney knows that case after case comes into his office 
where one spouse is so anxious to get rid of the other that 
he will sign any paper and agree to any conditions in 
order to rid himself of his mate, and, of course, in this 
case evidence was brought out at the hearing that the 
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defendant was advised by his former attorney to sign 
the stipulation, and that the amount would be cut down 
to a reasonable figure at a later date. There is no record 
in this appeal of what evidence was introduced at the 
default hearing on October 7th. Suffice i~ to say that the 
plaintiff knew that she had not received the $100.00 a 
n1onth under the temporary order, and yet she asked for 
$250.00 in the default case on October 7, 1947. The writer 
wonders that had the lower court known on October 7, 
1947, that the ,defendant had not paid the $100.00 per 
month as ordered on July 15, 194 7, whether or not he 
would not have insisted on going into the financial abili-
ty of the defendant to pay $250.00 per month. 
There is no evidence that the plaintiff demanded 
and insisted upon ~he payment of either the $100.00 per 
month under the July 15, 1947, order or the $250.00 per 
month under the October 7, 1947, decree prior to De-
cember 22, 1947, hut that she came into court and asked 
that this defendant he found in contempt. 
The court in his Finding No. 5 did not find that the 
defendant had earned enough to pay the $250.00 per 
month as provided in· the decree, but he did make a.find-
ing that defendant has been and now is capable of earn-
ing a sufficient amount to provide a substantial sum for 
the support of his former wife and children, and that his 
earnings in the past had been as high as $800.00 as cook, 
and is still able with reasonable effort to earn sufficient 
to comply with the terms of the decree. Where is the 
evidence to substantiate that he could earn sufficient to 
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the court feel that any fry cook at any time could get a 
job. or rather, let u~ say, a positio_n, for $800.00 per 
month? If that were possible, I believe that even the ranks 
of the legal profession would become thinner on account 
of their bec~n1ing fry cooks, and __ we might even lose a few 
judge~. Of course, there wa8 no evidence to substantiate 
such a finding, and the_ only question involved is whether 
the defendant had wilfully placed hhnself in a position so 
as not to comply with the terms of the decree of October 
7, 1 ~)-l-7. There is absolutely no eYidence to substantiate 
that. 
The case of Seliph r. Selph (Sup. Ct. Arizona, 1925), 
231 P. 921, on page 922, states: 
''The law does not require impossibilities, 
but it does exact good faith and an honest and 
conscientious effort to perform its orders and de-
crees.'' 
On page 923: 
''It has been held too that an inability to pay 
alimony brought about by the defendant's own 
act for the purpose· of avoiding its payment may 
be punished for contempt.'' 
The case at bar is similar in one respect to Hall v. 
Hall (Sup. Ct. Utah, March 3, 1947), 177 P. (2) 731-
F. --. In that case i.t appears that the lower court found 
the defendant in contempt for failure to pay alimony. 
The parties had stipulated to $65.00 a month, and the 
court arbitrarily raised the amount to $80.00 per month: 
On the hearing for contempt, the court asked the defend-
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ant if he had been able to pay the $80.'00 per month, and 
the defendant stated that he had not. The court arbitrari-
ly stated that there was no doubt in his mind but that the 
defendant could make these payments if he made up his 
mind to do it. 
In the case at bar, the court's findings were equally 
arbitrary and were unsupported by the eVidence. 
In W'ohlfort v. Wohlfort (Kans., 1924), 40 A.L.R. 
538,225 P. 746~ on page 750, the court says: 
''In such a case, when the court makes a 
reasonable order, the amount of which the hus-
band can pay out of his property or out of his 
earnings, the court has the power to commit him 
to jail for contempt if he willfully refuses to do 
so. But an order committing to jail is the exercise 
of the ultimate power of a court of equity, and 
the prudent chancellor is careful that there be no 
mistake in its use. It should be used only when 
it is clear (1) that the original order is reason-
able, (2) that the husband is able to comply with 
it ·without undue hardship, and (3) that his re-
fusal to comply with it is willful to such a degree 
as to be contumacious, amounting to contemptuous 
disobedience. When this situation is made clear, 
then the chancellor not only has the power, but it 
becomes his duty, to issue the commitment.'' 
The defendant contends in the case at bar ( 1) that 
the original order in this case of $250.00 per month was 
unreasonable; (2) that the defendant was unable to com-
ply with it at all; (3) that his refusal was not wilful at 
all and was not contumacious or contemptuous disobedi-
ence. 
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lt n1ust be borne in 1nind in this case that the order 
made after the hearing on Decernber 22, 1947, was the 
first an(l only order to be made. The defendant could not 
complain of that portion o~ the order wherein he was to 
pay one-half of what he 1nade after certain deductions. 
~nch an order has been upheld in the case of Wohlfiort z:. 
TVohlfort, supra. 
As to whether or not the court could have ordered 
the defendant to go and seek work ~t a place other than 
~Irs. Carlson's is in dispute with the authorities. In the 
case of Nl esservy v. M esservy, 67 SE 130, 30 LRAns 1001, 
the court held that it could not compel a husband who 
has no trade or profession or employment, to learn a 
trade, acquire a profession, or find employment, and, by 
exercise thereof, derive an income, to comply with the 
court's order to pay alimony to his wife, in a suit for her 
separate maintenance. 
A contrary view is found in Fowler v. Fowl~r, 61 
Okla. 280, 161 P. 227, LRA 1917C 89, which holds a man 
who has no money or tangible property may be adjudged 
in conten1pt of court in failing to pay alimony adjudged 
to be paid by him if he makes no honest effort, cQnsider-
ing hi~ 1nental and physical capabilities to work and earn 
woney to pay the same. 
The case of Andr:ews v. McM~ahan (New Mexico, 
1938), 85 P. (2) 743, held that the district court erred in 
committing an unemployed, divorced husband for con..: 
tempt in failing to pay his former wife the sums awarded 
h~· the divorce decree for the support of the minor child 
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and attorney's fees in the absence of a finding that he 
could find employment or had the· pecuniary ability to 
pay the judgment, although the court found that he had 
the ability and strength to do certain kinds of work. 
There was absolutely no evidence that the defendant 
Os1nus could find employment at $800.00 a month, or in 
any sum exceeding $40.00 per week, and owing to the 
fact tha~ the plaintiff had $5,000.00, there was no reason 
why the defendant should accept a job at $40.00.per week, 
which, if he turned over all of his wages to his wife, 
would still fall short of the amount ordered to be paid 
under the October 7, i947, decree. 
The defendant contends that the evidence wholly 
fails to substantiate the findings of the court in regard 
to his ability to pay and his ability to obtain work, and, 
therefore, it necessarily follows tha·t the order of the 
court finding the defendant in. contempt was wholly er-
roneous. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO 
MODIFY THE DECREE OF OCTOBER 7, 1947, IN 
RESPECT TO ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY. 
(Assignments Nos. 2 and 4.) 
The courts in Utah have held that to entitle a party 
to a modification of decree there must he a change in 
circumstances. 
Chaffee v. Chaffie,e, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76; Car. 
son v. Carson, 87 U. 1, 47 P (2) 894; Oo,dy v. 
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Cody, -!7 U. -!56, 467, 15-! P. ~)52; Rockwood v. 
Roclmvood, 65 U. 261, 236 P. 457. 
In this case the decree had not become final. It was 
entered on October I, 1947, and it was still in its inter-
locutory stage, and the court on its own motion may 
nwdify an interlocutory decree at any time before it 
becmnes final, and when that is done, time for appeal 
comn1ences to run from the date of entry of the new or 
1nodified decree. 
Salt Lake· City v. Industrial Commission, 
s2 r. 179,22 P. (2) 1046. 
This court has held, in the case of Anderrson v. An-
ders·on, -- U. --, 172 P. (2) 132, the criterion for de-
termination of support money is the need of the person 
supported and the defendant's ability to pay. 
The proper procedure for the party who is unable 
to comply with the order for payment of alimony or· sup-
port of minor children is to seek a modification of the 
order, not to resist its enforcement, -thereby subjecting 
himself to contempt proceedings. 
Bailey 'L 81(;perior Court (Calif., 1932) 11 
P. (2) 865. 
In the case at bar there are, of course, no changed 
conditions. The defendant was utterly unable to pay 
$250.00 per month on October 7, 1947, and his condition 
had not changed on December 22, 1947, when he was in 
court on his petition or application for modification. The 
lower court had its attention called to the fact that the 
dPeree of October 7, 1947, was excessive, ,that the defend-
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ant could not possibly comply with its provisions. The 
court could, and should at that time, have modified the 
alimony and support money provision in the decree. As 
it is, the $250.00 per month, or that part of it that the 
defendant is unable to pay, is pyramiding each and every 
rnonth, and, unless the defendant, by some miracle, ob-
tains a large sum of money to pay off the judgment, he 
will have a financial millstone around his neck that will 
forev~r discourage him from working. The court did, in 
his order in the hearing of December 22, 1947, order the 
defendant to pay one-half of his earnings, less proper de-
ductions, to apply on current and past obligations to the 
defendant; however, this order did not alter the $250.00 
per month provision in the decree. 
The excessive demands of plaintiff were certainly 
not based upon the defendant's ability to pay, bu·t ap-
pear rather to have stemmed from her desire for ven-
geance or revenge on account of his association with an-
other woman. The court should have modified the de-
cree, taking into consideration the needs of the plain-
tiff and the ability to pay of the defendant. Unfortunate-
ly, in all 'of these cases t~e needs must always yield to 
the ability to pay. In almost every divorce, unless the 
parties are rich, there is some economic maladjustment, 
and both parties must bear this together. If the decree of 
October 7, 1947, had made a ridiculously small allotment 
of alimony and support money, say $5.00 to each person, 
then, of course, within the six months' period the plain-
tiff· could have mo~ed ~to have the decree modified and 
corrected, and so it necessarily follows that in this case 
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the eourt could and should have granted the defendant 
~ome relief. 
CONCLUSION 
ln conclusion, the defendant contends that there was 
ab~olutely no evidence brought forth at the hearing that 
he in any way had the ability between October 7, 1947, 
and Dece1nber 22. 1947, to pay the defendant the $250.00 
per month as provided in the divorce decree, and the 
defendant further contends that there was absolutely ,no 
eYidence that he had by his OWll acts brought about his 
inability to pay the alimony and support money for the 
purpose of avoiding its payment, and that therefore the 
court's holding hiln in contempt should be set aside and 
the court's ruling reversed. 
Defendant further contends that payment of $250.00 
support money and alimony for a man in his circum-
stances and earning ability at this time is so excessive 
that the court's action in denying his applicatio:t]. for 
modification was absolute error, and that this court 
should on its own motion reduce said amount or should 
remand the case for further testimony before the district 
court in order that the lower court can make an order 
based upon the plaintiff's needs and the defendant's 
ability to pay. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. ·vERNON LANGLOIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
RAYS. McCARTY 
Of Counsel 
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